Why Türkiye and Israel cannot become allies in Syria
05 Dec 2024 00:05
By Abraham Shmulevich
Why Türkiye and Israel cannot become allies in Syria
The relationship between Türkiye and Israel has always been complex and multifaceted, marked by alternating periods of cooperation and tension. In recent years, however, these ties have reached a new low amid escalating geopolitical instability and differing agendas in the Syrian conflict. Despite past instances of collaboration, the current political landscape under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's administration poses significant barriers to any meaningful alliance between the two countries, News.az reports.
The relationship between Türkiye and Israel has always been complex and multifaceted, marked by alternating periods of cooperation and tension. In recent years, however, these ties have reached a new low amid escalating geopolitical instability and differing agendas in the Syrian conflict. Despite past instances of collaboration, the current political landscape under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's administration poses significant barriers to any meaningful alliance between the two countries.
Türkiye was one of the first countries to officially recognize Israel following its declaration of independence in 1948. This recognition was largely motivated by Türkiye's strategic interest in improving relations with the United States during the early stages of the Cold War. At the time, Türkiye was governed by a military regime and faced challenges in aligning itself with Western powers. Establishing diplomatic ties with Israel proved advantageous in bridging some of these gaps, especially as Israel itself was navigating its own complex relationship with the U.S.
Over the years, Türkiye and Israel developed a mutually beneficial relationship. Türkiye provided critical support to Israel, while Israel played a role in strengthening Türkiye’s ties with Western nations, particularly the United States. This dynamic was rooted in shared strategic interests, including military cooperation, intelligence sharing, and economic exchanges. The partnership was further solidified through joint efforts in areas such as counterterrorism and trade.
The political landscape began to shift dramatically with the rise of Erdoğan and his Justice and Development Party (AKP) in the early 2000s. Under Erdoğan's leadership, Türkiye’s foreign policy has undergone significant realignment, with a stronger emphasis on its identity as a leading voice in the Muslim world. This shift has often come at the expense of its relations with Israel. Erdoğan's government has frequently criticized Israel, particularly over its policies toward Palestinians, and has openly aligned itself with groups such as Hamas, which Israel considers a terrorist organization.
Erdoğan's rhetoric and actions have included calls to “liberate Jerusalem” and public displays of solidarity with the Palestinian cause. These moves have alienated Israel and contributed to the growing distrust between the two nations. Furthermore, Türkiye’s domestic media landscape, heavily influenced by the government, often portrays Israel in a negative light, further deepening the divide. State-backed agencies such as Anadolu frequently disseminate anti-Israel propaganda, which undermines any prospects of rebuilding trust.
The ongoing conflict in Syria represents a potential area where Türkiye and Israel could align their interests, yet cooperation remains elusive. Both nations share a desire to curb Iranian influence in the region and combat extremist groups that threaten their security. However, their inability to bridge political and ideological divides has prevented any meaningful collaboration.
Türkiye’s actions in Syria, particularly its military incursions and occupation of parts of northern Syria, have drawn criticism from Israel and other international actors. These moves are seen as attempts by Ankara to expand its regional influence under the guise of securing its borders from Kurdish groups it deems terrorists. Israel, meanwhile, is primarily focused on countering Iranian-backed forces operating near its borders and ensuring that Syria does not become a launchpad for attacks against its territory.
Although their objectives in Syria might overlap, the lack of trust and communication between the two countries has made joint efforts impossible. For example, incidents involving Israeli aircraft forced to make emergency landings in Türkiye have highlighted the hostility between the two nations. On one occasion, Türkiye denied medical assistance and refueling to an Israeli plane, even when a passenger required urgent care for a heart attack. Such actions violate international norms and underscore the deep-seated animosity.
The strained relationship between Türkiye and Israel also has significant economic and military implications. Türkiye, which has faced difficulties acquiring advanced military equipment from the U.S. and Europe, could potentially benefit from closer ties with Israel, a leader in defense technology. However, the current state of relations makes such cooperation highly unlikely.
Germany, for instance, has been actively modernizing its military, often with the assistance of Israeli technology. In contrast, Türkiye finds itself increasingly isolated in defense procurement, limiting its ability to modernize its armed forces. This isolation is further compounded by Türkiye's economic crisis, which has left it struggling to address domestic challenges. Improved relations with Israel could potentially open doors to international financial markets and technological advancements, but this opportunity remains untapped due to political tensions.
A significant barrier to reconciliation lies in the ideological divergence between the two nations. Erdoğan’s government has aligned itself with the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist movements, which often view Israel as an adversary. This alignment has shaped Türkiye’s foreign policy in ways that are fundamentally incompatible with Israel’s security concerns.
The media’s role in fueling animosity cannot be overstated. Türkiye’s state-controlled outlets regularly disseminate anti-Israel narratives, which contribute to a hostile public perception of Israel. This environment makes it politically risky for Turkish leaders to pursue rapprochement, even if it would serve the country’s strategic interests.
At present, the prospects for a Türkiye-Israel alliance appear bleak. While their shared interests in Syria and beyond could theoretically serve as a foundation for cooperation, the political and ideological barriers remain formidable. Türkiye’s domestic and foreign policies under Erdoğan have positioned it as an adversary rather than a partner to Israel.
For any meaningful change to occur, significant shifts would be required on both sides. Türkiye would need to reevaluate its alignment with Islamist movements and curb its anti-Israel rhetoric. Similarly, Israel would need to find ways to address Türkiye’s concerns without compromising its own security interests. However, such changes are unlikely as long as Erdoğan remains in power and continues to prioritize ideological considerations over pragmatic diplomacy.
In conclusion, while history offers examples of Türkiye and Israel working together, the current geopolitical realities make an alliance between the two nations in Syria improbable. As long as mistrust, propaganda, and conflicting ideologies dominate their relationship, the gap between them is likely to widen rather than narrow.
https://news.az/news/-why-turkiye-and-israel-cannot-become-allies-in-syria
